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Abstract. Th e article focuses on the human individual as a signifying and communicating 
self whose properties can be detected or assumed on the basis of its language in verbal 
communication through texts and text-processing activities or, more broadly, in both 
verbal and non-verbal communication through signs and sign-processing activities in 
the semiotics of culture. Th e point of departure is the distinction between the observable 
self and the inferable self, i.e., a concrete person who transmits and receives verbal and/or 
non-verbal messages, and a mental subject who is engaged in creating and comprehending 
them. As a consequence of this distinction, it can be stated that the communicative network 
of the human life-world consists of two types of collectivities. On the one hand, there are 
speakers and listeners of particular languages who form interpersonal collectivities of 
those transmitting and receiving perceivable meaning bearers through physical-acoustic 
sound waves in the communication channel; on the other hand, there are intersubjective 
collectivities of those who process and understand intelligible meaning bearers while 
referring them to an extra-linguistic reality through acts of reasoning and interpreting. 
Exposing the notion of polyglotism, this paper argues that a multiaspectual typology 
of selves is possible on the basis of the linguistic and cultural texts that characterize the 
social roles and pragmatic goals of communication participants in the various domains of 
the human life-world. Finally, it supports the conviction that interdependencies between 
language and culture must be primarily explained in terms of psychological, or rather, 
psycho-semiotic conditionings of humans. Since particular languages are products and 
components of social and cultural life, constantly being shaped and changed due to 
personal and subjective activities of human selves, polyglotism as both multilingualism 
and multiculturalism also implies an inquiry into their multicultural competence and 
multicultural identity.
Keywords: the self, polyglotism, semiotics, language, culture
Sign Syst ms Studies 43(2/3), 2015, 207–225
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2015.43.2-3.04
208 Elżbieta Magdalena Wąsik
1. From language to linguistic properties of signifying and 
communicating selves
In conformity with the “humanistic turn” of the post-structuralist period of the 1960s, we 
can now speak of the need to study human individuals as signifying and communicating 
selves whose properties can be detected or assumed on the basis of textual products 
and text-processing activities. In contrast to the “linguistic turn” of the fi rst half of the 
20th century, the attention of researchers has shift ed from language regarded as a tool 
of communication to the linguistic properties of speaking and/or listening individuals 
as members of speech collectivities or communicative collectivities broadly understood.
Th us, an approach to human individuals as communicators when they are treated 
both as (1) observable selves, engaged as persons in the processes of transmitting and 
receiving verbal signs; and (2) inferable selves occupied as mental subjects with sign-
production and sign-comprehension activities corresponds to the viewpoint adopted by 
representatives of linguistic and semiotic studies in the post-structuralist period dealing 
with humans as participants in communication. For practical reasons, researchers must 
take into account the distinction between the physical domain based on experiment and 
objective observation and the logical domain based on communication and subjective 
inference, formulated by Victor Huse Yngve, an American physicist and linguist, in his 
book From Grammar to Science from 1996. Th ese domains belong, respectively, to the 
so-called “hard sciences” which rely on empirical evidence and to the “soft  sciences” 
which depend upon rational thinking.
With reference to Yngve (1996: 93–106), some statements pertaining to signifi cative 
and communicative properties of humans can be formulated. Firstly, observable and/or 
inferable semiotic properties of the signifying and communicating self are investigated 
in the so-called physical domain and/or in the logical domain. Secondly, speakers and 
listeners who engage in communication in (a) given language(s) form collectivities of 
two types. Th e fi rst type comprises interpersonal collectivities of those who transmit 
and receive sensible bearers of meaning (which are observable, similarly to properties of 
human communicators, in the physical domain and describable in appropriate terms); 
and the second type includes intersubjective collectivities of those who understand or 
interpret the intelligible meaning bearers referring them to extra-linguistic reality (which 
are assumable in the logical domain). Following this approach, it has to be stressed 
that the properties of communicating individuals as members of interpersonal and 
intersubjective collectivities belong, on the one hand, to the investigative domain of the 
hard sciences, i.e., physics, chemistry, and biology, or, on the other hand, constitute the 
subject matter of the so-called soft  sciences such as linguistics, psychology, sociology, 
logic, and philosophy. Additionally, what is not at all insignifi cant is the statement that 
the everyday reality of humans is a social construct resulting from the typical contents 
of communication among members of societies and social groups.
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2. Dimensions of the concept of human self
In substantiating the need to associate the concept of human self to human communicative 
performances, Susan Petrilli’s studies on the self (i.e., human being) as a sign (Petrilli 
2013: 29, 59, 147; cf. also Petrilli 1988, 1990, 1998) should be borne in mind. Petrilli 
departs from Charles Sanders Peirce whose focus is on the self/sign in becoming in 
open-ended semiosic and semiotic processes (cf. CP). Also Norbert Wiley (1994) or 
John Pickering (1999) who have been dealing with the human self in terms of semiotic 
processes should be mentioned here. Th e notion of the self has been elaborated in 
philosophy and psychology, and applied in communicology. From the point of view 
of the present author, works of scholars such as William James, George Herbert Mead 
as well as Edmund Husserl are of vital importance here (cf. James 1890, 2001[1892]; 
Mead 1913, 1934; Husserl 1970[1956]).
Nowadays, the concept of the human self appears to be essential for the domain of 
linguistic studies, whenever issues of meaning and understanding are under consideration. 
Its application presupposes the statement that each speaking or communicating individual 
is both an exceptional and irreplaceable experiencing subject as well as an object of his 
or her own experience which may be characterized in terms of individual motivation, 
emotions, and beliefs. If the aim is to estimate the reliability of data coming from 
discourse studies oriented toward individual expression with reference to individual 
consciousness, it is indispensable to investigate what the notion of the self connotes with 
regard to the psychological dimension of human consciousness and mental processes, 
subjective experiencing of human sensations, feelings and emotions, and reasoning an 
individual is able to conduct. Th ere is a need, then, to realize that mental processes 
taking place within the mind of an individual, which involve verbal signs, proceed with 
or without participation of consciousness.
Referring to James 1890; 2001[1892] and Mead 1934, one has to suppose that thinking 
processes of an individual are streams of thoughts, internal intellectual procedures, 
internal conversations or interactions in which the I (i.e., the self as a subject) responds 
to the Me (i.e., the self as an object). Th ese processes refl ect mental experiences of 
individuals, their encounters within a society, and thus processes within a society. It 
should be added that it was James (cf., e.g., 2001: 43–83) who focused on two aspects of 
the self: (1) the self as an object that is known, or the Me; and (2) the self as a subjective 
knower, or the I; and who subsequently distinguished three components of the self 
as an object – the material, the social and the spiritual selves. James’ ascertainments 
pertaining to the self must be recognized as still valid and useful; however, the line 
of his reasoning about the existence mode of the self was, in spite of all, one of the 
distinguishing characteristics of the philosophy of St. Augustine and his followers, as 
demonstrated, for example, by Marguerite Witmer Kehr in her article “Th e doctrine 
of the self in St. Augustine and in Descartes” (Kehr 1916).
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In general, the notion of the self means the knowledge of an individual about him- or 
herself acquired in the processes of socialization on the basis of what has been thematized 
in biosemiotics as human primary modelling systems (cf. Sebeok, Danesi 2000). In 
contemporary approaches, the fact that the self is a biological organism is regarded as 
a prerequisite for its mental development emerging through existential experiences 
in the reality of everyday life, made possible, precisely, on the basis of species-specifi c 
modelling devices. Th anks to these experiences, human beings as organisms go beyond 
their biological conditionings. As a matter of fact, perceptions, beliefs, and thoughts 
of an individual, for example, on self-assessment, or evaluations of him- or herself in 
relation to others are metasemiosic processes favoured by the syntactic nature of human 
modelling and occupy a signifi cant place in his/her mental life.
Because the self is a personal and subjective phenomenon, the identity of an 
individual as a unique and independent human being is formed as a result of one’s 
sensory and conscious experiences in relation with the other. Except for diff erences 
between individuals, the impact of culture on the self-concept causes it to take shape 
in relation, inter alia, to cultural surroundings. At any rate, the self, in other words, 
the structure and contents of the emotional-intellectual experiences of an individual, 
emerges from interpersonal communication in changeable social and cultural contexts. 
One can thus say that the unique single self develops and is in becoming in relation 
with the other and its environment. As stated, among others, by Cliff ord Geertz (1973: 
52), humans as particular individuals are beings who give form, order, purpose and 
direction to their lives in terms of cultural patterns and systems of meaning which are 
created historically. Th us, while most of the self ’s properties develop in communicative 
interactions with the other, only some of them can be recognized as universal. In the 
light of arguments presented from the point of view of social and cultural psychology, 
for example, by Hasel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama (Markus, Kitayama 1991: 
225–231), it can be clearly concluded that diff erent shapes of the self are considered to 
be characteristic of diff erent cultures.
Th e psychic properties of the human self embedded in culture and society do not 
only cause particular individuals to understand other individuals through messages 
dependent upon communicative situations or circumstances that accompany them. As 
a matter of fact, humans also possess a disposition to take appropriate action towards 
objects about which they have some knowledge. Th erefore, representatives of social 
psychology, e.g., Douglas T. Kenrick, Steven L. Neuberg, and Robert B. Cialdini (1999), 
who devote their attention to problems of social cognition and motivation determining 
the behaviour of humans, do not dispense with the notion of the self. Th ey analyse 
and explain cases of mutual encounters among unique individual selves, which consist 
in infl uencing others, for example, by persuasion and manipulation, leading to social 
affi  liation, friendship and cooperation, or by prejudice and stereotypes, amounting to 
confl icts, discrimination, aggression, violence, etc. Moreover, based on the practice of 
 The polyglot self in the semiotic spheres of language and culture  211
everyday life social psychologists uncover a large diff erentiation among individuals 
at the levels of both their psyche and behaviour. Th eir observations also point to the 
existence of inconsistencies in what participants in social interaction believe and say, 
as well as what they ultimately do.
Assuming that the interpretation of meaning ascribed to communicative means by 
some communicating individuals is performed in the logical domain by other individuals 
as communication participants or by researchers as external observers studying human 
communication, it would be appropriate to explain the psychological mechanisms 
which accompany the formation of linguistic expressions. At this point, the depiction 
of the human self as described by a Polish representative of linguistic pragmatics and 
sociolinguistics Roman Kopytko (2002: 117–121) is worthy of attention of specialists 
who deal with meaning, understanding and interpretative activities of humans (cf. 
also Kopytko 2003). Having summarized the previous knowledge of mental aspects of 
man for the needs of linguistic-pragmatic studies, Kopytko emphasizes that the self is 
responsible for the organization of data coming from experiences, for the maintenance 
of self-esteem, and for striking the balance between pleasure and pain in the life of an 
individual. Kopytko’s primary conclusion, drawn in compliance with Tory E. Higgins’ 
understanding of the self (cf. Higgins 1987), is that an individual’s self-awareness, which 
determines his or her current linguistic performances, constitutes in qualitative terms, 
at each instance, the result of how the cognitive-aff ective-conative system works. Strictly 
speaking, awareness of the self and others is dependent on the mutual interaction 
between the three domains of the self: (1) the actual self, primarily governed by the 
cognitive system, constituting in fact the conceptual awareness of the self; (2) the ought 
self; and (3) the ideal self. Both the ought self and the ideal self infl uence the actual 
self which, however, is governed by the aff ective and conative systems as well. Th is is 
because all three parts of the self, the actual, the ought and the ideal, appear together 
in diff erent combinations and at diff erent levels in any instance and are responsible 
for the cognitive processes and communicative activity of the individual. Th ese parts 
or components of the self jointly contribute to the development of the human ability 
to think by means of internal signs processed in intrapersonal communication and, 
in the same measure, they determine the process of using their external counterparts 
transmitted and received in interpersonal communication.
In reference to the foregoing discussion, being assured that knowledge, emotions, 
and will take part in the selection of linguistic and semiotic signs for the creation 
of communicatively relevant meanings, special importance has to be attached to the 
distinction between the observable self and the inferable self. As stated earlier, this 
distinction suggests that the communicating self is engaged as a person in the experiential 
acts of transmitting and receiving verbal signs in the physical domain, and, at the 
same time, is occupied as a mental subject with the intellectual acts of processing and 
interpreting the meanings of verbal and non-verbal signs in the logical domain.
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3. Observable and inferable properties of the self in 
the physical and logical domains of the human life-world
Th e life-world of humans, a world that the individual selves must experience collectively, 
was defi ned by creators and advocates of the idea of the phenomenological notion of 
intersubjectivity, in particular, by Edmund Husserl (cf. mainly his position expressed 
in Th e Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl 1970: 108–109, 133, 142; unfi nished in 
German and published in an English translation aft er the author’s death). Alluding to 
Husserl’s concept of the human life-world (Lebenswelt) – “In whatever way we may be 
conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, 
we, each ‘I-the-man’ and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one 
another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing 
precisely through this ‘living together’” (Husserl 1970: 108) – one has to agree with the 
assumption of mundane phenomenology that, in the life history of individuals, there 
must be a shared background for experiencing all things and states of aff air which occur 
in reality. Moreover, one has to notice that this background must continuously change 
as a consequence of an ongoing communication between individuals; it must, however, 
be diff erent from the objective reality assumed to exist outside or around individuals.
Th ere can be no doubt that the human life-world, interpreted as the reality of everyday 
by social constructivists Peter Ludwig Berger and Th omas Luckmann (1966), comes 
into being as a result of the communicative activity of humans, which is based, on 
the one hand, on the concrete transmission or exchange of material meaning bearers 
and, on the other hand, on the mental attainment or achievement of commonalities 
of meanings, pertaining to shared views, beliefs, ideas, knowledge, attitudes and/or 
values, etc., inferred from conceptual and propositional contents of interpreted and 
understood meaning bearers. Th is particular statement brings to mind or is tantamount 
to the already mentioned distinctions between the observable and inferable properties 
of the selves as communication participants as well as between the interpersonal and 
intersubjective collectivities in human communication.
To continue this course of reasoning, it is necessary to explain the postulates addressed 
by Yngve (1996) to linguists, namely, that the object of empirical study should constitute 
not language but linguistic properties of individuals, who communicate with other 
individuals through the physical-acoustic communication channel, being available in the 
physical domain. However, despite Yngve’s claim, one has to endorse the assertion that 
interpersonal communication takes place both in the physical and the logical domains.
Rectifying the idea put forward by Yngve (1996) that communication should be 
investigated exclusively in the physical domain within the framework of hard sciences, 
the view that people not only talk but also understand each other needs to be put forward. 
While the production of verbal means is a concrete act, comprehending them on the 
basis of concluded reality is a mental act. Th us, the physical domain unites speakers and 
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listeners who communicate with each other through sound waves and other observable 
objects as parts of their surroundings which are relevant for the realization of their tasks. 
Hence, if communication consists in both an exchange of material meaning bearers 
and their interpretation by people, it must be studied along with the facts which belong 
both to the physical and the logical domains of human life-worlds. In these worlds of 
observable and inferable reality mediated by verbal signs, the human being as a bearer 
or user of language lives and reaches an agreement with others.
Bearing in mind the need for theoretical separation of two kinds of properties of 
the communicating selves, analogously to the two pairs of detached dimensions in the 
study of human communication, one has to speak in favour of investigating verbal 
and nonverbal signs as cognizable and associated phenomena which take place on 
two mutually concatenated planes, namely, the objective plane of expression and the 
objective, if observed, or subjective, if concluded, plane of reference. Hence, the products 
of verbal behaviour and the accompanying nonverbal behaviour appear as observable 
in the physical domain, when realized or codifi ed in such sensorially perceivable 
meaning bearers as speech-sound waves or their surrogates functioning in the context 
of paralinguistic and non-linguistic signs. Th eoreticians of communication, Michael 
Burgoon and Michael Ruff ner (1978: 130–146) have classifi ed such signs into movement, 
posture, gesture, facial expressions, eye contact, physical appearance (especially body 
shape, skin colour, texture, hair, clothing accessories, and cosmetics), touch, smell, 
artifacts, interpersonal distance, timing and sequencing of activities and statements. 
However, while being displaced in time and space, i.e., directly not observable here 
and now, the communicated objects of reference, along with the communicative aims, 
intentions or tasks realized by communicating individuals, belong to the logical domain 
as far as they can be only inferred on the basis of human conduct or its products. Th ey 
are only ascribed to particular communication participants by other communication 
participants. In the same manner, subjective mental states cannot be described in terms 
of physical phenomena even though conscious activity operates within the brain that 
is a physical organ. Th us, when examining the properties of communicating selves, the 
researcher is faced with the necessity to account for data which are accessible to empirical 
observations with the aim to assess interpersonal relationships as well as to cognize and 
to interpret the meaning of verbal messages in an attempt to infer about intersubjective 
relationships linking participants of communication (on the investigative consequences 
of the distinction between the physical and logical domains of communication, see 
Wąsik 2010 against the background of Yngve 1996).
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4. The polyglot individual in a text- and role-oriented 
typology of the human selves
If the capacity of acquiring natural languages is the fi rst and most basic among human 
aptitudes responsible for the signifi cative and communicative activity of human 
individuals, communicating selves are to be considered as polyglot selves. Humans 
as communicators, who possess the ability to know many languages as one of their 
heteronomous dependences, should be considered in accordance with the assumption 
that, becoming or being polyglot, they make choices between languages and language 
varieties in encounters with others, taking into account the social and situational 
communication circumstances.
glôtta ‘tongue’) refers to a human individual who speaks, writes, or reads several languages 
(cf. Random House 1997[1992]). It remains in close semantic relations with the notion of 
multilingualism (or also bilingualism) used with reference to individuals being profi cient 
in more than only one language, and defi ned in the fi rst place by linguists, researchers 
of language contacts or anthropologists, as Leonard Bloomfi eld (1933: 55–56), Uriel 
Weinreich (1953: 1), Einar Ingvald Haugen (1953: 6–7), and A. Richard Diebold, Jr. (1961: 
99). However, the use of notions such as bilingualism and multilingualism, or bilingual 
and multilingual, as applied currently in foreign language teaching, is not restricted to 
referring to individuals characterized by a perfect fl uency in (a) foreign language(s). 
On the contrary, diff erent kinds of polyglottism or multilingualism, dependent on the 
degree individuals master particular languages and the extent to which they use them, 
are distinguished by, e.g., Hugo Baetens Beardsmore (1982: 1–36), Josiane F. Hamers 
and Michel H. A. Blanc (2000[1983]: 6–27), Bee Chin Ng and Gillian Wigglesworth 
(2007: 6–17); works of these authors give a certain idea of linguistic conditionings of 
human individuals as selves communicating in natural languages.
First of all, as one might conclude from descriptions of multilinguals, formulated 
mainly for the needs of foreign language instructors who are interested in developing 
the linguistic competences of their students, humans really neither learn particular 
languages simultaneously since early childhood nor use them as entirely equivalent 
means of communication. Th ey rather acquire particular languages in diff erent periods 
of their life, in diff erent environmental conditions, with diff erent motivation, which, in 
turn, results in diff erent cognitive eff ects, non-equal competence in particular language 
skills, and thus in a non-uniform deployment of languages in diff erent situations. In 
addition, individuals rarely master and use languages of equal status, that is, they oft en 
speak dialects or other non-standard varieties. What is important, an acquisition of each 
language leads to the adoption of a new cultural identity, so that multilingual individuals 
Th e term polyglot (derived from the Greek polyglôttos ‘many-tongued’, combining the 
stems polys ‘much’ or ‘many’ and glôttos ‘tongued’, which is an adnominal adjective of 
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seldom appear to be monocultural. As it follows from investigations pertaining to the 
acquisition, knowledge and use of two or more languages, there are both quantitative 
and qualitative diff erences between linguistic performances of particular individuals. 
In general, the regularity can be observed that the more complex the mechanisms 
involved in language learning, the more compound the cognitive processes taking place 
in the mind of an individual turn out to be. A linguist who deals with texts spoken and 
written by bi- or multilingual individuals pays attention to tendencies of their producers 
toward code-switching and interlingual borrowings, as well as language transfers and 
cross-linguistic interferences.
According to some researchers of multilingualism, multilingual and multicultural 
competence (see, e.g., Cook 2002), the acquisition of two or many languages is discussed 
in terms of the development of language competence which is not twofold or multiple, 
but rather multidimensional. For instance, in the opinion of Francois Grosjean, a Swiss 
psycholinguist, bilinguals always blend competencies in two languages. Th erefore, 
these kind of communicators must be characterized as speakers and listeners who in 
no case can be treated as the sum of two monolinguals but rather, or most of all, as 
exclusively integrated wholes consisting of unique and specifi c persons and subjects 
of communication (cf. especially Grosjean 2008: 13–14).
Observations pertaining to psychological and societal reasons of multilingualism 
as a widespread property of human individuals and to diff erent forms and ways of 
its manifestation may constitute a point of reference for refl ections about the self in 
communication in general. At this point, for example, Grosjean’s arguments presented 
in his books with characteristic titles, such as Life with Two Languages (1982) and 
Bilingual: Life and Reality (2010), turn out to be useful. He is convinced that it is an 
understatement or an oversimplifi cation to maintain that bilinguals are distinguished 
just by the fact that they regularly use two or more languages in their everyday life. As a 
psychologist, Grosjean proves empirically that bilinguals speak two languages which for 
them constitute a certain linguistic continuum, together or separately, depending on their 
goals and aims realized in encounters with diff erent people in diff erent domains of life. 
Th e notion of the language mode introduced by Grosjean in his article “Th e bilingual’s 
language modes” (2001) is also important. Th e article aims to show that it is the specifi city 
of social situations in the everyday life of bilingual individuals, understood by them 
subjectively, which induces them to undertake particular manners of verbal behaviour. 
Literally, Grosjean (e.g., 2008: 36) has defi ned the language mode as the state of activation 
of the bilingual’s languages and language processing mechanisms at a given point in 
time. In his opinion, it has a decisive impact on the everyday behaviour of the bilingual. 
In particular, interferences may occur in the monolingual language mode, while the 
bilingual mode is characterized by the appearance of such forms of mixing as code-
switching and borrowing. Th e concept of language mode indicates unconscious and 
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conscious mixing of languages resulting in interference, code-switching, borrowing, 
etc. It allows assessing bilingual individuals according to whether they are acquiring a 
new language or losing one, or whether their bilingualism remains stable or not, etc. 
In sum, since diff erent aspects of life of an individual require diff erent languages, his 
or her linguistic knowledge, including the knowledge of vocabulary, does change over 
time, but probably not at the same pace for the so-called stable and unstable bilinguals. 
Being aware of the psychological aspects of language processing mechanisms, one 
has to conclude that, from a sociological point of view, the choice of a language by 
communicators (i.e., a particular natural language or a language variety) depends on 
the need for that language and is, in sociolinguistic terms, domain specifi c.
Human individuals are not infrequently bi- or multilingual in the literal sense. In 
everyday life, knowers and users of natural languages, language varieties, and also of a 
number of other semiotic codes may be considered as polyglot selves. All communicative 
performances of humans could be considered as governed by communication modes 
between which they must move as external conditionings and states of their mind change. 
As one might suppose, principles according to which participants in interpersonal 
communication switch into modes directing their verbal and nonverbal behaviour 
when they adjust to situations and persons with whom they interact must be similar to 
mechanisms directing the language modes of bi- or multilinguals. It can be even assumed 
that motives as well as goals and intentions of human individuals can be deduced by 
their conversation partners being aware of the changeability of the mental states of others 
which cause them not only to use diff erent languages or language varieties, i.e., dialects, 
stylistic or functional varieties, jargons or slangs, etc., but also to choose between modes 
of speaking and/or to resort to varied means of signifi cation and communication. And 
fi nally, the communicative properties of the selves manifested, for example, in code-
switching come under scrutiny in the physical domain, while, for example, the identity 
of an individual expressed by switching between two or more languages or language 
varieties should be investigated and described in the logical domain.
As far as the communicative repertoires of particular individuals are concerned, 
verbal and nonverbal means which are internalized by particular individuals in their 
cultures and used depending on with whom, when, and why they communicate, e.g., 
words and phrases, set expressions in natural languages they prefer, etc., change over 
time, because the social environment as well as needs and values of individuals change. 
Exposing the notion of the polyglot self in the context of semiotic and cultural studies, 
one has to highlight the impossibility of describing the total communicative repertoire 
of an individual. In addition, attention should be paid to the idea of cultural polyglotism 
with reference to the notion of ‘cultural text’ introduced by Juri Lotman, the founder 
of the Tartu–Moscow School of Semiotics, inaugurated in 1964 (for details see Kull et 
al. 2011), which became famous aft er the translation into several languages of “Th eses 
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on the semiotic study of cultures (as applied to Slavic texts)” (Uspensky et al. 1973), 
and his further related articles (cf. Lotman 1973, as well as Lotman 1974, 1988[1981], 
1994[1981]).
In view of the fact that the communicating selves who have at their disposal 
cultural languages as sign systems are the true agents in human communication, and 
that their communicative properties constantly change depending on multifarious 
social and cultural conditionings, the importance of the context(s) in which verbal 
texts are produced and interpreted should be recognized. Nevertheless, being aware 
of the psychological mechanisms according to which signs arise in the minds of 
human individuals, researchers who investigate linguistic texts as products of the 
sign-communicational activity of the human selves can never be sure whether their 
knowledge of the (external) context is suffi  cient.
However, if language is treated as a human-related semiotic fact belonging to the 
phenomenal life-world, its individual speakers and listeners can be considered as 
manifestations of various types of the selves. As communication participants, they act 
verbally and nonverbally throughout their lives, presumably depending on how their 
cognitive-aff ective-conative systems operate within their minds because they are able 
to create utterances according to patterns delivered by their languages and cultures 
from which they make choices individually. In order to create a typology of the selves 
that might be deduced from spoken and written texts which characterize the social 
roles and pragmatic goals of communication participants in various domains of the 
human life-world, researchers must accept temporary and long-lasting psychological 
and cultural conditionings of humans as classifi catory criteria. Moreover, assuming 
that the communicating selves act as persons and subjects in both interpersonal 
and intersubjective collectivities, they could eventually prove or infer which parts of 
their inner selves become manifested, in a linguistic and non-linguistic manner, at 
a particular moment. As stated above, it is possible to demonstrate empirically how 
individuals, communicating with each other, are bound by sound waves and other 
surrogate codes transmitted and received via communication channels, and that it is 
a matter of assumption how they interpret meaning bearers while making reference 
to a commonly known extra-linguistic reality in a similar way. Th us, the existence of 
linkages between the minds of individual communication participants is deducible 
from presupposition, intuition, reasoning and/or imagination.
Consequently, the following statements should be taken into consideration. It is 
thanks to the processes of interpersonal communication that the transition from self-
awareness to identity takes place. Th e subjective mental image someone has of him- or 
herself as a person aff ects the ways he or she produces and understands verbal signs as 
meaning bearers. If the identity of individuals fi nds expression in externalized verbal 
texts (in lexical elements and grammatical forms, characteristic of languages they speak) 
218 Elżbieta Magdalena Wąsik
similarly to other products of their activity, parts of the cognitive self can be read from the 
properties of the communicating individual (from the preferred words and expressions 
he or she utters or writes and the presumed ways of their interpretation). Th ereby, the 
process of identifi cation must proceed at the level of the individual’s cognitive system. 
Th e individual’s knowledge pertaining to him- or herself and others comes from sensory 
experience and must be conscious, which means that, before expressing it verbally, people 
must fi rst know or be convinced which information they gain from their senses, whether 
they have positive or negative sensations and feelings, whether they act or have desires, 
wills, or wishes. In a typological survey of selves, all components of the human self in 
general, such as the material self, the social self, the spiritual self, the remembering self 
and the imaginative self, as well as the emotional self in particular, must be subsumed 
under the capacities of the cognitive self. It is so, because the cognitive self is the knower 
of its body, its properties and states, its possessions and other persons, such as its near 
relatives, its states of mind and thoughts. It has views, ideas, beliefs, attitudes, etc., of 
the self and others and toward the self and others; moreover, it is the knower of facts, 
views, beliefs, and attitudes that the others possess. As a matter of fact, when humans 
talk about feelings or acts of will, they are really talking about their own thoughts, about 
their feelings and acts of will. Since semiotic systems available to human individuals 
impose certain categories on the world perceived by them, the notion of the categorical 
self must be equal to that of the cognitive self. Furthermore, feelings and inclinations, 
which are not verbalized, remain unconscious, but they are driving forces of the self 
as well. Hence, the understanding of the cognitive self must be supplemented with the 
aff ective and the conative parts of the self, if impulses coming, for example, from body 
language are translated into natural language(s). 
Among diff erent parts of the cognitive self, the concept of the social self (understood 
as the interpersonal or collective self) deserves closer attention. Th e self in general 
develops when a human individual is appreciated, recognized or respected by others. Th e 
social self thus refl ects the membership of an individual in social groups. Communication 
participants, owing to social encounters, usually learn to feel solidarity with groups or 
believe in their particular status. Examples of the social selves, the number of which can 
be practically unlimited, may be derived from the sense of their belonging to ethnic, 
professional or age groups, groups of people who are bound together by their place of 
origin or residence, or by common interests, gender groups, etc.
However, humans as beings endowed with reason (homo animal rationale) can be 
above all estimated and understood in terms of the true or rational selves responsible 
for resolute endeavours to improve their personalities by striving for their moral 
improvement. Th eir dilemmas come down to fi nding a middle road between bodily 
needs and pleasures on the one hand, and values and commitments resulting from the 
fact of belonging to groups of diff erent kind and cultural requirements on the other 
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hand. In connection with the questions of self-esteem, self-acceptance or self-affi  rmation 
bothering individuals, the notions of the real self, the ideal self, the normative self, the 
deceptive self, the pragmatic self, the ironic self must also be added.
In sum, however, aspects and constituents of the self in general can be deduced from 
the verbal and non-verbal behaviour of human communicators who, while sharing 
their life-world with others, undoubtedly exhibit the properties of polyglotism. Th ese 
properties can be revealed under the condition that, each time, suitable criterions will 
be elaborated with reference to the social and cultural contexts. One has to recognize 
the importance of the situational and cultural context(s) in which verbal texts are 
produced and interpreted. Texts refl ect various types of interpersonal relationships 
ascertainable in social reality. 
Researchers who look for linguistic-communicational properties of people in the 
domain of task-and-means-oriented dialogical texts, usually start from the properties 
of the communicating selves, go through the observable elements making up various 
kinds of temporary and long-lasting collectivities, and end with the aggregation of the 
chains of communication participants in the structure of human society. With a view 
to the self engaged in communication, using natural languages and other systems of 
signifi cation to convey meanings to others, it has to be stated that diff erent individuals, 
having the same verbal devices at their disposal, do not use them in exactly the same 
way because of specifi c, internal, or psychological contexts which constitute the source, 
i.e., an underlying cause of changes in the universe of meaning.
5. The semiotic existence mode of 
the intraorganismic self
By way of conclusion, subjectivity of verbal signs which come into being in the minds of 
human individuals should be exposed against the background of research on language 
as a property of communicating individuals. As a matter of fact, language-, culture- 
and organism-oriented studies in the post-structuralist period of linguistics and 
semiotics concentrate essentially on issues of multilingualism, multidiscursivism and 
multiculturalism in the context of interpersonal and global communication, mutual 
understanding and misunderstanding. Ultimately, it is the texts embedded in the social 
and cultural relations, discursive practices, speech acts, speech genres, on a par with 
communicative events, dialogical utterances, conversations, etc., which have become 
the object of linguistic studies.
In fact, contemporary scholars who search for communication patterns of groups 
derive their methodology from the domain of the ethnography of communication, 
whose basic terms, concepts and issues have been defi ned by Muriel Saville-Troike 
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(1982: 12–50). In her work, linguists are seen in the broadest sense as language- and 
culture-oriented researchers who are faced with the need to interpret multi-layered 
utterances which depend on personal, social and historical experiences of communication 
participants. In another fi eld of study, those who utilize the achievements of cognitive 
linguistics tend to present the individual’s knowledge of the world in the form of mental 
refl ections of concepts included in propositional contents of verbal utterances, and 
preserved in the social meanings of linguistic entities, units and constructions. In this 
way, scholars who, unlike the supporters of mentalist constructivism, see the cause 
of cognitive processes in the ability of an organism to interact with its environment, 
tend to follow the idea of enactionism having its roots in the biological conceptions of 
Humberto R. Maturana, Francisco J. Varela (cf., e.g., Maturana, Varela 1980, 1987), Evan 
Th omson, and Eleanor Rosch, and developed, inter alia, in Anthropological Linguistics 
by William A. Foley (1997: 8–11). With regard to theoretical foundations of embodied 
semantics, they claim that human individuals as biological organisms cognize the reality 
through their senses only; hence, there is no objective meaning, but the meaning is 
rather embedded in their lived histories.
Currently, language is studied, following the postmodern trends, alongside with issues 
of ideology, values, ethics, and subjective needs realized through verbal understanding 
in spoken and written communication. Th erefore, further refl ections pertaining to 
human individuals as signifying and communicating subjects in their personal and 
cultural conditionings come to the fore. Particularly, the semiotic nature of the human 
self deserves special attention of contemporary practitioners of language sciences. Th is 
postulate entails detaching the mental subject whose intellectual properties are assumed 
only from the concrete, real person who is observed in the communication “theatre” of 
everyday life. Th e inner self as a mental subject is engaged in activities of sign-processing 
and sign-understanding, yet the outer self as a concrete person is the transmitter and 
receiver of signs.
In relation to the concepts of the self and subjectivity, the investigative framework of 
existential semiotics elaborated by Eero Tarasti is worth separate mentioning. Inspired 
by idealistic philosophers who dealt with the alterity of the ego or otherness in terms 
of transcendence, the Finnish semiotician and philosopher considers the human body 
to be the carrier of personal properties and the material basis for semiotic processes 
of the mental subject who copes with his or her being in the world through rational 
acts in the consciousness. He formulated his human centered conception of the object 
of neosemiotics at the 9th Congress of the IASS/AIS (Helsinki-Imatra, 11–17 June 
2007), and thoroughly extended it in an entry to Th e Oxford Handbook of Culture and 
Psychology (cf. Tarasti 2009: 1755–1772, 2011: 316–343). 
Having developed the foundations of his theory, Eero Tarasti departs from two 
existential categories of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1910[1807]), namely, an-
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sich-sein ‘being-in-itself ’ and für-sich-sein ‘being-for-itself ’, enriching them with two 
additional distinctions, an-mir-sein ‘being-in-myself ’ and für-mich-sein ‘being-for-
myself ’, aft er the terminological modifi cation in French (être-en-moi – être-en-soi vs. 
être-pour-moi – être-pour-soi) proposed by Jacques Fontanille (2004: 22–23), while listing 
such four forms of being, in other words, the existence modes of the self in consistency 
with the understanding specifi ed above, as (1) being-in-myself – an-mir-sein – être-
en-moi – the bodily ego of the self manifested in its appearance and performance; (2) 
being-for-myself – für-mich-sein – être-pour-moi – the awareness of the self as an observer 
shift ing to possible acts of transcendence; (3) being-in-itself – an-sich-sein – être-en-soi – 
the cultural-normative potentialities of the self; and (4) being-for-itself – für-sich-sein 
– être-pour-soi – the role-oriented realization of the self in society and culture. 
Against the background of experiential states of the self, known from communication 
theory, such as: ‘the real self ’, ‘the self ’s self ’, ‘the other’s self ’, and ‘the self ’s’ other’s 
self ’ (cf. Burgoon, Ruff ner 1978), the acts of transcendence distinguished by Tarasti, 
in which the individual subject is not satisfi ed with his or her universe of being, can 
be analysed in the following order – fi rstly, the inner pressure of movement; secondly, 
the possibility of acting; thirdly, the inner determination to act; and fi nally, the power 
of intellectual eff ort of being acquainted with. Th ese four existence modes, expressed 
through particular verbs, such as ‘will’, ‘can’, ‘must’, and ‘know’, may run or pass through 
the mental operations of individual and social parts of human individuals as well (cf. 
Tarasti 2009: 1763–1766, and 2011: 328–329).
It is obvious therefore that the contents of the individual part of the self are 
transformed within the organism into the social part of the self as soon as he or she 
starts to interact with others. External observers may notice here that human beings 
as private selves do not communicate with one another directly, but it is rather their 
social part determined by group affi  liation and cultural experiences which is engaged 
in communication. Hence, a conclusion can be drawn that the existence of human 
beings – who are active in various pragmatic spheres of language- and culture-in-use 
and who thus become polyglot in their life-worlds – is enabled through the semiotic 
means, which facilitate their individual thinking and reasoning as well as their mutual 
understanding in society. While paraphrasing the metaphor of polyglotism, applied 
to culture as a system of “texts”, one could fi nally state that the communicating self as 
a “cultural polyglot” must be able to cope with texts coming from diff erent cultures, 
i.e., he or she must know how to communicate in and understand the multiplicity of 
cultural languages. All in all, the knowers of diff erent languages and cultures might be 
described as possessing interlingual and intercultural competences.
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Полиглотизм Self  в семиотических сферах языка и культуры
В статье рассматривается индивид как коммуницирующий и продуцирующий значения Self. 
Его характеристики можно определить (или предположить) на основе текстов, вербального 
языка, а также шире – на основе использования и обработки знаков как в вербальном, так 
и невербальном общении. Отправным пунктом является различение между наблюдаемым 
(observable) и возможным в качестве вывода (inferable) Self, т.е. между конкретным человеком, 
принимающим и передающим вербальные или невербальные сообщения и ментальным 
субъектом, который создает и интерпретирует эти сообщения. Такое различение позволяет 
утверждать, что коммуникативная сеть жизненного мира людей состоит из коллективов 
двух типов. Первый тип – это коллектив разговаривающих на конкретном языке индивидов, 
которые передают и принимают сообщения посредством физико-акустических звуковых 
волн. Второй тип – коллектив субъектов, которые обрабатывают понятных им носителей 
значения, соотнося их с внеязыковой реальностью посредством актов интерпретации. 
В статье исследуется возможность многоаспектной типологии Self на основе языковых 
и культурных текстов, которые характеризуют социальные роли и прагматические цели 
участников коммуникации в разных областях жизненного мира человека. Автор статьи 
придерживается убеждения, что взаимозависимость языка и культуры целесообразно 
объяснять в терминах психологической, вернее, психосемиотической обусловленности 
человека. Так как конкретные языки являются составными частями общественной и 
культурной жизни, которая благодаря личной и субъективной деятельности человека 
находится в постоянном движении и изменении, полиглотизм (как многоязыковой, так и 
многокультурный) указывает на необходимость изучать мультикультурную компетенцию 
и мультикультурный идентитет.
Ise polüglotism keele ja kultuuri semiootilistes sfäärides
Artikkel keskendub inimindiviidile kui tähendustloovale ja suhtlevale Isele (self), kelle omadusi 
võib tuvastada või nende kohta oletusi teha tekstide ja tekstitöötlustegevuste kaudu selle põhjal, 
milline on tema verbaalses suhtluses avalduv keel, või, laiemas tähenduses, nii verbaalses kui ka 
mitteverbaalses suhtluses märkide ja märgitöötlemise kaudu kultuurisemiootikas.  Lähtekohaks 
on eristus vaadeldava (observable) ja tuletatava (inferable) Ise vahel, s.t verbaalseid ja/või 
mitteverbaalseid sõnumeid edastava ja vastu võtva konkreetse inimese ning nende loomise ja 
mõistmisega tegeleva mentaalse subjekti vahel. Selle eristuse tulemusena võib väita, et inimeste 
elumaailma kommunikatiivne võrgustik koosneb kaht tüüpi kollektiividest. Ühest küljest on olemas 
konkreetsete keelte kuulajad ja kõnelejad, kes moodustavad isikute kollektiive, millesse kuuluvad 
need, kes edastavad ja võtavad kommunikatsioonikanalis vastu meelelisi tähenduskandjaid 
füüsikalis-akustiliste helilainete kaudu. Teisalt on olemas subjektide kollektiivid, mille moodustavad 
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need, kes töötlevad ja mõistavad arusaadavaid tähenduskandjaid, seostades neid keelevälise 
tegelikkusega arutlemis- ja tõlgendamisaktide kaudu. Vaadeldes polüglotismi mõistet, väidab 
artikkel, et on võimalik Isede mitmeaspektiline tüpoloogia keeleliste ja kultuuriliste tekstide põhjal, 
mis iseloomustavad kommunikatsoonis osalejate sotsiaalseid rolle ja pragmaatilisi eesmärke 
inimeste elumaailma erinevates valdkondades. Lõpus toetab artikkel veendumust, et keele ja 
kultuuri vahelist vastastiksõltuvust tuleb peamiselt seletada inimeste psühholoogilise või pigem 
psühhosemiootilise tingituse terminites. Et konkreetsed keeled on ühiskondliku ja kultuurilise 
elu saadused ja koostisosad, mis on tänu inimeste isiklikule ja subjektiivsele tegevusele pidevalt 
kujunemises ja muutumises, viitab polüglotism nii mitmekeelsuse kui ka mitmekultuursusena 
vajadusele uurida nende multikultuurset kompetentsi ja multikultuurset identiteeti.
